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Abstract 
Article III:4 of the GATT requires the Members of the WTO to accord imported products treatment no 
less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products. Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement 
imposes the same obligation in respect of technical regulations. In a series of cases, the Appellate 
Body has ruled in essence that imported and domestic products are ‘like products’ within the meaning 
of Article III:4 of the GATT if they directly compete in the market and that the imported product is 
accorded ‘less favourable treatment’ within the meaning of that provision if it is accorded less 
favourable competitive opportunities. 
Regulations that distinguish between different types of products and accord one of them less 
favourable treatment are typically adopted precisely because the market does not make the distinction 
that the regulator considers necessary. Many, if not most, regulations are thus likely to be inconsistent 
with Article III:4 according to the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence. The ten policy goals listed in 
Article XX of the GATT do not comprise all legitimate policy goals that Members pursue through 
measures covered by Article III. There is consequently a range of perfectly legitimate internal 
regulations that are not applied so as to afford protection but are nevertheless not justifiable under 
Article XX. This includes all regulations that distinguish between competing products for the purpose 
of harmonising standards, improving the efficiency of production, reducing transaction costs for 
consumers or preventing deceptive practices. They distinguish between groups of competing products, 
treat one group less favourably than the other and serve a purpose not listed in Article XX. The 
Appellate Body’s market-oriented approach renders all of them inconsistent with Article III:4 and 
gives Article XX a function that it cannot fulfil. 
Keywords 
Article III of the GATT, national treatment, like products, aims-and-effects test, no less favourable 
treatment, Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, Article XX of the GATT. 
 
 1 
Introduction* 
Professor Matsushita is an expert in both domestic and international economic law and has written 
impressive papers touching upon the potential conflicts between the two. As a member of the WTO 
Appellate Body he was involved in a number of appeals that touched upon the right of the Members of 
the WTO to impose internal measures affecting the sale of domestic and imported products. After 
Professor Matsushita’s departure from the Appellate Body in March 2000, the Appellate Body issued 
a number of rulings defining the scope of the regulatory autonomy of Members under the national-
treatment provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) and the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). Given Professor Matsushita’s interest in the 
relationship between international trade law and domestic regulations I would like to contribute to this 
Liber Amicorum a brief analysis of these rulings. 
Article III:4 of GATT requires the Members of the WTO to accord imported products treatment no 
less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products. Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement 
imposes the same obligation in respect of technical regulations. In a series of cases, the Appellate 
Body has ruled in essence that imported and domestic products are ‘like products’ within the meaning 
of Article III:4 of the GATT if they directly compete in the market and that the imported product is 
accorded ‘less favourable treatment’ within the meaning of that provision if it is accorded less 
favourable competitive opportunities.
1
  
In EC – Asbestos the Appellate Body explained: 
As products that are in a competitive relationship in the marketplace could be affected through 
treatment of imports ‘less favourable’ than the treatment accorded to domestic products, it follows 
that the word ‘like’ in Article III:4 is to be interpreted to apply to products that are in such a 
competitive relationship. Thus, a determination of ‘likeness’ under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, 
a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among 
products.
2
 
Regulations that distinguish between different types of products and accord one of them less 
favourable treatment are typically adopted precisely because the market does not make the distinction 
that the regulator considers necessary. For instance, if a government prohibits the use of garbage bags 
that cannot be easily incinerated, it presumably does so because the public purchasing such bags does 
not take into account how difficult it is to dispose of them. In practice, many, if not most, regulations 
are consequently applied to competing products and prohibit the placing on the market of one of them. 
Many, if not most, regulations are thus likely to be inconsistent with Article III:4 according to the 
Appellate Body’s jurisprudence.  
This is a surprising result because, according to Article III:1, the scope of application of the whole 
of Article III is confined to regulations applied ‘so as to afford protection’. In the view of the 
Appellate Body, Article III:4 itself is an expression of the principle set forth in Article III:1. It argues 
that, ‘if there is “less favourable treatment” of the group of “like” imported products, there is, 
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conversely, “protection” of the group of “like” domestic products.’3 However, Article III:1 does not 
refer to measures whose application protects domestic production. It refers to measure applied ‘so as 
to’ protect domestic production. ‘So as to’ means ‘with the aim and effect’. The objective of Article 
III:1 is therefore achieved only with an interpretation of Article III:4 that takes into account not only 
the effect of the regulatory distinction but also its aim. Put differently, Article III is not intended to 
apply to all regulations that have a, possibly incidental, protective effect; it applies only to regulations 
that are aimed to produce such effects. 
The GATT Panel in US – Malt Beverages explained the pitfalls of likeness determinations that fail 
to take into account the aim of the regulatory distinction as follows: 
The purpose of Article III is not to prevent contracting parties from differentiating between 
different product categories for policy purposes unrelated to the protection of domestic 
production. . . Once products are designated as like products, a regulatory differentiation, e.g. for 
standardization or environmental purposes, becomes inconsistent with Article III even if the 
regulation is not ‘applied . . . so as to afford protection to domestic production’. In the view of the 
panel, it is therefore imperative that the like product determination in the context of Article III be 
made in such a way that it does not unnecessarily infringe upon the regulatory authority and 
domestic policy options of contracting parties. . . . Consequently, in determining whether two 
products subject to different treatment are like products, it is necessary to consider whether such 
product differentiation is being made ‘so as to afford protection’.
4
 
Some regulations making product distinctions for legitimate purposes might be justifiable under one of 
the public policy exceptions set out in Article XX of the GATT. However, the ten policy goals listed 
in Article XX do not comprise the immense realm of legitimate policy goals pursued through internal 
regulations. The policy goals listed in Article XX are largely identical to the policy goals listed in the 
general exceptions clause of the 1929 League of Nations Convention on the Abolition of Import and 
Export Prohibitions Restrictions.
5
 Article XX was thus drafted with policy objectives in mind that can 
only be realised by discriminating between products as to their origin or destination, in particular 
policy goals that can only be achieved through import or export restrictions. Thus, the protection of 
human health can require import restriction on products carrying diseases. That policy goal is included 
in both the League of Nations convention and Article XX. Conversely, the harmonisation of technical 
standards does not require measures discriminating between products as to their origin or destination. 
That policy goal is included in neither the League of Nations convention nor Article XX. In any case, 
given the brief, exhaustive list of policy purposes included in Article XX it is obvious that the drafters 
had never intended this provision to be the sole legal basis for justifying internal regulations that 
distinguish between groups of products competing in the domestic market solely on the basis of their 
physical characteristics and accord one of them less favourable treatment.  
Contrary to a common misconception, Article XX is thus not a list of important societal values of 
the Members of the WTO, and the ten policy goals listed in this provision do not comprise all 
legitimate policy goals that Members pursue through measures covered by Article III. The drafters of 
the GATT therefore obviously assumed that the legitimacy of a distinction between products with 
different physical characteristics would be taken into account under Article III, and that a need to 
invoke Article XX would arise only in respect of internal regulations that distinguished between 
products as to their origin or destination. The drafters of the TBT Agreement similarly assumed that 
technical regulations that distinguish products with different characteristics for legitimate policy 
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reasons would not be found to violate that Agreement’s national-treatment requirement because they 
did not include any public policy exception similar to Article XX in that Agreement. 
There is thus a range of perfectly legitimate internal regulations that are not applied ‘so as to afford 
protection’ but are nevertheless not justifiable under Article XX. This includes all regulations that 
distinguish between competing products for the purpose of harmonising standards, improving the 
efficiency of production, reducing transaction costs for consumers or preventing deceptive practices.
6
 
The Appellate Body’s market-oriented approach renders all of them inconsistent with Article III:4, 
makes Article III:1 inoperative in the context of Article III:4 and gives Article XX a function that it 
cannot fulfil. If transposed to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the consequences are even more far-
reaching because of the lack of a public policy exception. 
In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, the United States appealed the finding of the panel that likeness 
can be determined purely on the basis of physical characteristics, consumer uses and tariff 
classification without considering whether the regulatory distinctions are made so as to afford 
protection to domestic production. The United States suggested that the Appellate Body follow instead 
the ‘aims-and-effects’ approach adopted by the GATT panel in US – Malt Beverages.7 The Appellate 
Body reacted with complete silence. There is in its legal analysis not a word evaluating the United 
States’ argument. 
In EC – Bananas the Appellate Body sharply rejected an initiative of the panel to inquire into the 
purpose of the measure at issue before finding it inconsistent with Article III:4. It ruled that ‘Article 
III:4 does not specifically refer to Article III:1. Therefore, a determination of whether there has been a 
violation of Article III:4 does not require a separate consideration of whether a measure “afford[s] 
protection to domestic production”’.8 It is true that Article III:2 distinguishes between internal charges 
on ‘like’ and directly competitive products and refers to Article III:1 only in respect of the latter while 
Article III:4 makes no distinction between ‘like’ and directly competitive products and contains no 
explicit reference to Article III:1. However, the lack of reference to Article III:1 in Article III:4 cannot 
be decisive because Article III:1 unambiguously defines the object and purpose of the whole of Article 
III and therefore also implicitly addresses the issue of likeness under Article III:4.  
In EC – Asbestos there was another attempt to make the Appellate Body change its approach to 
likeness determinations, this time by the EU. The EU explained: 
If non-commercial considerations may only be considered at the Article XX stage of the analysis, 
then the list of policy purposes for which regulators may distinguish between products is unduly 
limited to the categories listed in Article XX.
9
  
Again, there was absolutely no evaluation of the EU’s arguments reflected in the Appellate Body’s 
report. One member of the Division wrote in a separate opinion: ‘The necessity or appropriateness of 
adopting a “fundamentally” economic interpretation of the “likeness” of products under Article III:4 
of the GATT 1994 does not appear to me to be free from substantial doubt . . .’.10 However, the 
member did not explain whether these doubts were related to the problems to which the EU had 
alerted the Division. 
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And so two important Members of WTO asked the Appellate Body to refrain from adopting an 
interpretation of Article III:4 that, in their view, unduly curtails their regulatory autonomy and the 
Appellate Body does not evaluate their concerns with one word. And a panel’s concern about this 
interpretation is dismissed by the Appellate Body without any substantive evaluation of the issue. I 
said to myself that, one day, a perfectly legitimate regulation will be before the Appellate Body that 
does not fall under one of the sub-paragraphs of Article XX and the Appellate Body will then be 
forced to either declare it illegal or change its jurisprudence. Or a case will arise under the national 
treatment provisions of the TBT Agreement that will put the Appellate Body before the same choice. 
This happened sooner that I thought. In the US – Clove Cigarettes case the panel found that the 
interpretation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement should not be approached primarily from a 
competition-oriented perspective, but that the weighing of the evidence relating to the ‘likeness’ 
criteria should be influenced by the fact that the regulation at issue had the purpose of regulating 
flavoured cigarettes for public health reasons.
11
 The Appellate Body did not budge, insisting that an 
interpretation of the concept of ‘likeness’ under the TBT Agreement must also be based on the 
competitive relationship between and among the products. However, it did not exclude a consideration 
of the policy purpose of the regulation altogether. It ruled that:  
the context and object and purpose of the TBT Agreement weigh in favour of reading the 
‘treatment no less favourable’ requirement of Article 2.1 as prohibiting both de jure and de facto 
discrimination against imported products, while at the same time permitting detrimental impact on 
competitive opportunities for imports that stems exclusively from legitimate regulatory 
distinctions.
12
 
If a panel has to examine whether the purpose of the regulatory distinction is legitimate, does it not 
have to examine its aim? And if it must examine its impact on imported products, does it not also have 
to examine its effect? Did the Appellate Body not introduce into Article 2.1 the ‘aims-and-effects’ test 
in disguise? I believe it did and I presume there was a sigh of relief among the Members of the WTO. 
I found it somewhat strange that the Appellate Body concluded that the place to conduct the inquiry 
into the purpose and effect of the regulatory distinction was not the concept of likeness but the concept 
of no-less-favourable treatment. Whether two products that are not identical should nevertheless be 
considered to be alike depends on the relevance of the differences between them and that, in turn, 
varies with the purpose and consequence of the regulatory distinction between them. The likeness 
determination therefore seems to be the natural place to take the legitimacy and the impact of the 
regulatory distinction into account. Moreover, both under GATT and WTO jurisprudence, the 
approach to likeness varied over the years while the assessment of the treatment of products has 
consistently been limited to an assessment of the competitive opportunities accorded to them. That 
approach was originally adopted in 1958 by the GATT panel in Italy – Agricultural Machinery13 and 
had since then been followed, without exception or variation, by all GATT and WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body in respect of all agreements. The Appellate Body thus preserved the consistency of its 
jurisprudence on likeness at the expense of changing the well-established jurisprudence on no-less-
favourable treatment.  
Be that as it may, the Appellate Body avoided, under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the 
unfortunate consequences of the exclusively market-based approach under Article III:4 of the GATT. 
The next step, I thought, would be to extend the novel interpretation of the no-less-favourable 
treatment concept to Article III:4 of the GATT. Then the scope of regulatory autonomy would not be 
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narrower under the GATT than under the TBT Agreement. Technical regulations must meet the 
requirements of both the TBT Agreement and the GATT, and, in respect such regulations, Members 
are consequently free to invoke their rights under either agreement. It therefore does not make sense to 
permit under the TBT Agreement regulations imposed for any legitimate policy purpose but permit 
under the GATT only those serving the few purposes listed in Article XX. If that were the case, 
Members adversely affected by a technical regulation serving a legitimate purpose not listed in Article 
XX could obtain a withdrawal of the regulation by invoking their rights under the GATT rather than 
the TBT Agreement. That would nullify the practical effect of the Appellate Body’s interpretation of 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, and that would not be permitted by the Appellate Body.  
So I thought. But I was to be surprised.  
In EC – Seals Products the Panel found that the legal standard that the Appellate Body had 
developed for Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement did not equally apply to Article III:4 of the GATT. 
The EU appealed. It explained that this could lead to a situation where, under Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement, a technical regulation that has a detrimental impact on imports would be permitted if such 
detrimental impact stems from a legitimate regulatory distinction, while, under the GATT, the same 
technical regulation would be permitted only if its objective falls within one of the subparagraphs of 
Article XX. As a consequence, complainants would have a strong incentive not to invoke Article 2.1 
of the TBT Agreement and, instead, to bring claims under the GATT, even if the measure at issue 
qualified as a technical regulation.
14
 
The Appellate Body responded that the EU perceived a legal imbalance that did not exist. It stated: 
under the TBT Agreement, the balance between the desire to avoid creating unnecessary obstacles 
to international trade under the fifth recital, and the recognition of Members' right to regulate 
under the sixth recital, is not, in principle, different from the balance set out in the GATT 1994, 
where obligations such as national treatment in Article III are qualified by the general exceptions 
provision of Article XX.
15
  
It noted, but did not address, the difference in the range of policy goals that may be pursued under the 
TBT Agreement and the GATT. Instead, it called the practical relevance of that difference into 
question, stating that:  
the European Union has not pointed to any concrete examples of a legitimate objective that could 
factor into an analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, but would not fall within the 
scope of Article XX of the GATT 1994.
16
  
I found this statement surprising. First of all, the EU did provide examples to illustrate its concerns, 
among them regulations whose objective is to provide origin information to consumers, an objective 
that clearly falls outside the scope of Article XX.
17
 The Appellate Body dealt with such a regulation in 
US – COOL and hence was fully aware of that example. In that case, the complainants invoked both 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Article III:4 of the GATT, and the Panel, having found the 
measure to be inconsistent with the TBT Agreement, exercised judicial economy with respect to the 
claims under the GATT. However, suppose the complainants had invoked only their rights under the 
GATT, then the COOL regulation would have had to be declared to be inconsistent with the GATT 
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simply because it distinguishes products competing in the market. This would have been an absurd 
result. 
A simple glance at the notifications of technical regulations made by Members to the TBT 
Committee could have provided the Appellate Body with further examples. These notifications 
include regulations designed to provide consumers with information on the net content of pre-
packaged products,
18
 to harmonise the technical standards for tractors and the machinery towed by 
them,
19
 and to ensure that consumers are informed of the presence of aromas in wine products.
20
 All 
these measures distinguish between groups of competing products, treat one group less favourably 
than the other and serve a purpose not listed in Article XX. The Appellate Body’s refusal to interpret 
Article III:4 of the GATT in harmony with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement makes all of them 
subject to challenge under the GATT. 
The Appellate Body concludes its examination by asserting that:  
our interpretation of the legal standards under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, and Article 
2.1 of the TBT Agreement, is based on the text of those provisions, as understood in their context, 
and in the light of the object and purpose of the agreements in which they appear, as is our 
mandate. If there is a perceived imbalance in the existing rights and obligations under the TBT 
Agreement and the GATT 1994, the authority rests with the Members of the WTO to address that 
imbalance.
21
  
This is a most unfortunate statement. The discrepancy in the scope of regulatory autonomy under the 
TBT Agreement and the GATT is the result of interpretative choices made by the Appellate Body. 
There is no principle of interpretation that prevents the Appellate Body from addressing this 
discrepancy by adopting the interpretation proposed by the EU. By ruling otherwise, the current 
Appellate Body effectively ruled that a future Appellate Body, perhaps composed of different 
members, that examines the same issue in another case could not adopt a different interpretation 
because it would be exceeding its mandate. I ask myself whether the Division acted within its mandate 
under the DSU and in accordance with the Appellate Body’s internal collegiality rules when it 
declared that no interpretation other than the one it adopted to resolve the case before it could be 
adopted in any future case. Whatever the answer to this question, it was no doubt unwise for the 
Appellate Body, and hardly in its institutional interest, to cast its own interpretative authority into 
fetters. 
The EU’s arguments implied that the Appellate Body, with its exclusively market-based approach 
to the interpretation of Article III:4, had manoeuvred itself into a dead-end street. The Appellate Body 
defends itself against that accusation by denying the existence and relevance of the problem and its 
competence to resolve it. It begins by claiming that the scope of regulatory autonomy was ‘in 
principle’ the same under the TBT Agreement and the GATT, which is legally incorrect. It then 
suggests that the imbalance perceived by the EU would not have any practical relevance, which is 
factually incorrect. And, finally, it declares that if Members nevertheless perceived an imbalance, only 
they could address it, which is institutionally untenable. There is no recognition of the problem, no 
evaluation of different avenues to solve the problem and no ruling on the problem. The reader is left 
with the impression that the Appellate Body adjudicated in this most unfortunate case not a dispute 
between the EU and other Members but a conflict between the EU and itself, and that the EU had no 
fair hearing because the Appellate Body was the judge and the accused at the same time.  
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What will the Appellate Body do if the issue arises again in a future case? Would it then declare a 
perfectly legitimate domestic regulation to be inconsistent with WTO law merely because it 
distinguishes between products for reasons not listed in Article XX? That is possible but unlikely. The 
Appellate Body has the right to change its jurisprudence (and has done so frequently, albeit not 
explicitly)
22
 and it is not legally bound by the reasoning supporting earlier rulings. However, in this 
case, the Appellate Body would not only be expected to explain the need for a change but also why it 
now considers the new interpretation to be consistent with the accepted principles of interpretation and 
its mandate. The Appellate Body may therefore seek to avoid the issue. It might, for instance, 
compensate its narrow interpretation of Article III with an interpretation of the sub-paragraphs of 
Article XX sufficiently broad to cover all legitimate regulations that come before it. However, Article 
XX is a general exception that can in principle be invoked in respect of any provision of the GATT. 
The broadened interpretation could therefore be invoked not only in respect of internal regulations but 
also in respect of import restrictions, customs tariffs and other measures imposed at the border, and it 
would therefore have unintended side effects. Correcting the narrow interpretation of Article III 
through a permissive interpretation of Article XX would therefore weaken the international trade order 
generally. I therefore hope that the Appellate Body will not follow a path of least resistance but 
reconsider its interpretation of Article III:4 and harmonise the scope of the Member’s regulatory 
autonomy under the national-treatment provisions of the TBT Agreement and the GATT. 
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